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Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
Contributory Negligence, and Assumption
of Risk
Dix W. Noel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In one of the most influential articles dealing with the legal responsibility for defective products, Dean Wade predicted that the strict liability in tort doctrine adopted by the American Law Institute in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts' would "soon become the established
rule."12 He added that some courts doubtless "will continue to speak the
language of warranty, but they will usually recognize that liability
sounds in tort, and they will seldom be led into applying contractual
restrictions."' The prediction has been amply borne out, since at least
36 jurisdictions4 have expressed their general approval of the
* Alumni Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. A.B. 1927, LL.B. 1930,
Harvard University; M.A. 1938, Columbia University.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. Wade, Strict Tort Liabilityof Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 25 (1965).
3. Id. at 25.
4. Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying Vermont law); Parsons v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 422 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1970) (applying New Mexico law); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories. Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (applying Idaho law); Schenfeld v. Norton Co.,
391 F.2d 420, 425 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying Colorado law); Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302
F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969) (applying Louisiana law); Klimas v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
297 F. Supp. 937 (D.R.I. 1969) (applying Rhode Island law); Bronson v. Club Comanche, Inc.,
286 F. Supp. 21 (D.V.I. 1968) (applying Virgin Islands law); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263
F. Supp. 159, 161 (D.S.D. 1967) (applying South Dakota law); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237
F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (applying Indiana law); Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc.,
454 P.2d 244, 248 (Alas. 1969); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 559, 447 P.2d 248, 251
(1968); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 560, 227 A.2d 418, 423 (1967);
Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970); Royal v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp.,
470 P.2d 240, 243 (Hawaii 1970); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111.2d 612, 621, 210 N.E.2d
182, 187 (1965); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prods., Inc., 258 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. 1970); HawkeyeSecurity Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Bereman v. Burdolski, 204
Kan. 162. 460 P.2d 567 (1969); Dealers Transp. Co. Inc. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441,
446 (Ky. 1965); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965);
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 338-40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 500-01 (1967); State
Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411
S.W.2d 443, 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439,
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Restatement provision concerning strict liability in tort.Despite this general acceptance, some questions have arisen concerning the meaning and application of the Restatement's strict tort
liability provisions. One of the more significant problems is the definition of the kind of conduct by the plaintiff that should defeat recovery,
particularly the effect of abnormal use of the product, contributory
negligence, and voluntary assumption of risk.
This article will attempt to analyze these three general kinds of
conduct on the part of the plaintiff, giving attention to basic tort principles and to traditional distinctions. Special emphasis will be placed on
the functions of court and jury in resolving questions posed by situations
in which injury is caused both by a defective product and by the plaintiff's handling of that product. It will be shown that a court's choice of
policy factors as a basis for strict liability may affect considerably its
final decision.
More specifically, in the area of abnormal use questions arise about
what uses of a product by the plaintiff should be regarded as sufficiently
abnormal to defeat his recovery. Should a distinction be made between
use for an abnormal purpose and use for a proper purpose but in a
careless manner, as is the case when the plaintiff fails to follow instructions? Should abnormal use be differentiated from contributory negligence?
Turning to contributory negligence, if plaintiff fails to discover the
existence of a dangerous defect in a product when a man of ordinary
420 P.2d 855 (1966); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969);
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-66, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1965); Schrib v.
Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (1969) (court applied RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965) in the circumstances of this case, but declined to embrace the Restatement view as
the law in the state); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965);
Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900, 914-15 (Okla. 1965); Heaton v. Ford Motor
Co., 248 Ore. 467, 470-71, 435 P.2d 806, 808 (1967); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 427, 220 A.2d
853, 854 (1966); Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co., 220 Tenn. 459, 462, 418 S.W.2d 430, 431 (1967);
McKisson v. Salei Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex. 1967); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.,
75 Wash. 2d 522, 530-32, 452 P.2d 729, 734 (1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 155
N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965), that provides as follows: "§ 402
A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer (I) One who
sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.'"
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prudence would make this discovery, should this failure bar an action
based on strict liability in tort, as it does when the plaintiff's claim is
based on the negligent supplying of a defective product? Suppose that
the plaintiff simply has failed to guard against the possibility of a defect,
as when he drives at excessive speed, knowing that some proportion of
all tires may fail when driven too fast. Since this conduct bars recovery
completely in a case based on negligence, should it have any effect on
the plaintiff's recovery in a strict liability case?
The third kind of conduct to be considered is voluntary assumption
of risk-the plaintiff actually discovers the defect and realizes the danger, but nevertheless voluntarily continues to use the product. The plaintiff, for example, continues to use a car after discovering that the brakes
are more or less defective. To what extent should the "obviousness" of
the defect, or of the danger, suffice to establish as a matter of law that
the plaintiff knew and appreciated the risk? Should the rule be any
different when the plaintiff is injured while using the defective product
in the course of his employment?
In attempting to answer these questions, attention will be focused
on the plaintiff's conduct in strict tort and warranty cases, but products
liability cases based on negligence will be considered incidentally.
II.

ABNORMAL USE

It is generally agreed that a manufacturer or supplier is not liable
when the plaintiffs injury results from an abnormal use of the product.
In negligence cases, assuming the use is unforeseeable, recovery is denied
on the ground that the result is not within the risk, or, as many courts
state the matter, the result is not proximately caused by the defendant's
conduct., If a defective roller skate is left at the top of a dark flight of
stairs and the plaintiff falls as a result, no court would hold that the
maker of the skate is obliged to guard against this sort of harm; the only
proximate cause of the accident is the leaving of the skate at a dangerous
place.7 As the Restatement illustrates, if a man buys an automobile tire
designed for ordinary use and installs it on his racing car, he cannot
complain when it blows out only because used for racing.' Likewise,
when the action is based on strict liability, the supplier's responsibility
6. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 668 (4th ed. 1971). See also Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 I11.2d 418, 431, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970) (stating that the issue of misuse "may
arise in connection with the plaintiff's proof of an unreasonably dangerous condition or in proximate causation or both").
7. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.6, at 1546 (1956).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295, commentj at 331 (1965).
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does not extend to abnormal uses. A product is not regarded as defective
and unreasonably dangerous when "the injury results from abnormal
handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to
remove the cap" 9 or when an adequate warning is given against a particular use of the product. 10
Since a product is not considered defective when the injury results
from abnormal handling, it follows that abnormal use is not an affirmative defense; rather the plaintiff must show as an essential element of his
case that the product was characterized by a defect that caused the
accident. The appropriate test for distinguishing "normal" from "abnormal" use is whether the use is one that the supplier of the product
anticipates or should anticipate. In some cases the foreseeability of the
use is quite clear. So it has been said that "automobiles will surely be
driven, sometimes at high speed, and often where other vehicles and
pedestrians are present"; and that hair dye "will be applied to hair and
will touch the skin; cosmetics will be applied to faces; underclothes will
be worn next to the skin; tractors will get mired; food will be
eaten .... ,,12 Although the test is easily stated, distinguishing normal
from abnormal use in the individual case is often difficult.
A.

Tests of Normal and Abnormal Use

The duty of a supplier to foresee certain uses of his product often
imposed in negligence cases, even though the use was uninbeen
has
tended by the maker of the product. Recovery was allowed, for example,
when a woman stood on a chair designed in such a way that it tipped
forward when weight was placed near the front, since a jury could find
that the supplier should have anticipated that chairs would be used not
only for sitting but standing.1 3 Likewise, when a woman wore a highly
9. Id. § 402A, comment h at 351. See also Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 111.2d 418, 431,
261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, commentj at 353 (1965), states that with a
warning, the product "is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Recent strict
liability decisions supporting this position are Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th
Cir. 1968) (applying Idaho law); LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affd,
407 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1969); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (1963). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 102, at 668; Noel, Products Defective
Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings,23 Sw. L.J. 256, 267 (1969).
11. See text accompanying notes 24-31 infra. In Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 III. 2d 418,
425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 310 (1970), misuse is defined as "use for a purpose neither intended nor
'foreseeable' (objectively reasonable) by the defendant."
12. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 7.
13. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 654, 235 P.2d 857,
859-60 (1951).
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inflammable dress near a kitchen stove, a jury could find that this use
was foreseeable. 4
In strict liability cases the same duty to foresee certain unintended
uses has been recognized, and ordinarily the factual issue of the foreseeability of a particular use has been left to the jury. A jury has been
allowed to find it foreseeable that a child of six might use an inflammable hair spray on her dress and hair, 15 and that a child of five might be
wearing a highly inflammable jacket while playing near a fire.'"
In some cases, however, the courts have ruled as a matter of law
that a particular use of the product is not foreseeable. It has been held
that a supplier could not foresee that a woman would continue to wear
shoes that were two sizes too small, 17 or employ defendant's alkaline
product "Calgonite," designed for automatic dishwashers, rather than
the defendant's water softener, "Calgon," in water used to wash venetian blinds.'
1. Unintended Uses.-These decisions seem reasonable, but other
decisions that find particular uses unforeseeable as a matter of law are
questionable, chiefly because the court placed too much emphasis on the
fact that the product was not being used for the intended purpose. A
housewife who splashed cleaning fluid into her eye was unable to recover
for permanent injury because "the cleaning preparation was not intended for use in the eye."' 9 Another court referred to that decision as
"wrong," and permitted a jury to find that a manufacturer of paint
should have anticipated that the product might in some way be splashed
2
into the eye of a painter's helper. 1
A more recent example of the way in which the intended use doctrine may be used questionably is the current controversy over whether
a manufacturer must design a car with adequate attention to its "crashworthiness," to prevent the occupants of a car from being injured by a
"second collision." Until recently most courts have denied the existence
of a duty to protect passengers from this risk, stating that "the intended
14. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952). This action was
against the retailer for negligence and breach of warranty. The negligence count was dismissed
because the retailer, unlike the manufacturer, had no reason to know that the dress was almost
explosively inflammable.
15. Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Il1. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964).
16. LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (applying Pennsylvania law).
17. Dubbs v. Zak Bros. Co., 38 Ohio App. 299, 175 N.E. 626 (1931). This suit was against
the retailer; the nonliability of the manufacturer is more evident.
18. Shaw v. Calgon, Inc., 35 N.J. Super. 319, 332, 114 A.2d 278, 285 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1955).
19. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855, 856 (5th Cir. 1946) (applying Louisiana law).
20. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
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purpose of an automobile does not include participation in collisions
with other objects. ' 21 Recent decisions, however, have recognized that a
jury may define the foreseeable use of an automobile to include involvement in a collision; consequently, there would be a duty to assure reasonable protection when a collision occurs.2 2 This new trend does not mean
that courts always will allow the question to go to the jury-administrative regulation, with the advantages of prospective operation,
uniformity, and extensive research may have a significant bearing on the
decision.23
2. Actual Foreseeabilityof Use.-Other questionable cases have
ruled as a matter of law that a particular use was not foreseeable because
21. See General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied. 386 U.S.
1037 (1967) (no duty to avoid designing ignition system so key could be removed without turning
off motor and taking unbraked car out of gear). This case was decided in the same way in state
court. Muncy v. General Motors Corp., 357 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Evans v. General
Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) (no duty to equip all automobiles with side rail perimeter frames); Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966) (no duty to design a safer
hood latch); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (Corvair burst
into flames after collision; no duty under Ohio law to make car safe when involved in collisions);
Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (no duty under Texas law to avoid
making car that would break into 2 sections on impact); Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 261 F.
Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968)
(no duty under Indiana law to refrain from making cars with unnecessary horsepower and capable
of excessive speed); Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (bicycle rider collided with sharp fin of parked car; case applied Texas law); Drummond v. General Motors Corp.,
CCH PRODS. LIAB. REP. 5611 (Los Angeles Super. Ct. 1966) (design of Corvair suspension system); General Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971) (steering wheel and column
assembly failed to telescope for the driver's protection); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d
797 (Miss. 1970) (no liability when heater not so designed as to prevent injury to passenger after
collision); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969) (no liability when defective
seat only enhanced injury and did not cause accident itself); Biavaschi v. Frost, CCH PRODS. LIAB.
6547 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970) (no liability when design of steering wheel only enhanced injury
REP.
but did not cause primary accident); Burkhard v. Short, CCH PRODS. LIAB. REP. f, 6549 (Williams County, Ohio C.P.), affd, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141 (1971) (dashboard only aggravated injury,
it did not cause accident); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Talbert, CCH PRODS. LIAB. REP. r 6550
(Wash. Super. Ct. 1970) (no liability when front-end design of Volkswagon micro-bus allowed
aggravation of passenger's injuries but did not cause the collision itself).
22. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (duty to use due care to
design steering shaft to avoid rearward displacement of column, or to warn of the danger under
Minnesota law); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (duty to
design fuel tank of automobile to avoid unreasonable risk under Wisconsin law); Dyson v. General
Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (duty under Pennsylvania law to design roof of
2-door model hardtop to provide same reasonable protection for passengers as do other versions
of that model); Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968), cert.
dismissed, 225 Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1969) (duty to design seats of truck to prevent collapse
from impact of shifting cargo); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969) (duty
to design gearshift knob to act as protective device against steel gearshift lever). See also Nader &
Page, Automobile Design and the JudicialProcess, 55 CALIF. L. Rav. 645,655 (1967).
23. See 80 HARV. L. Rav. 688 (1967); 42 NoTRE DAME LAW. 111 (1966).
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the supplier of the product did not actually foresee the use involved. In
one of these cases defendants supplied window casements with steel
crossbars designed to support glass. While using the crossbars either as
a handrest or as a ladder, a workman fell to his death because the
crossbar was not firmly enough secured for such use. There was testimony, however, that it was common practice for iron and steel workers
to climb up and down the casements. The court ruled that the supplier
could not be charged with notice of this practice, but would be liable
only in case of actual knowledge."
The requirement of actual knowledge is not supported by torts
writers;2 1 furthermore this requirement was clearly rejected in the leading
recent case on abnormal use, Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks.2 6 In that
case the defendant manufactured and packaged doors for overseas shipment. The doors had openings for glass, and when they were packaged
in bundles the openings formed a well, covered only by cardboard. When
the doors were stowed for shipment, the longshoremen used bundles
already laid down as a floor in stowing the next layer. A stevedore
stepped on the cardboard, fell through the well, and was injured. There
was testimony that it was a general practice of stevedores to walk on
cargo and it further was stated that many shippers of doors knew of this
custom and packaged their products accordingly; they would either cut
holes in the packaging to expose the cavity, or place a warning notice
on bundles that falsely appeared to be solid.
The trial judge told the jury they could find liability if the shipper
"knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known" that
persons might walk on the packaged doors. Judgment for the plaintiff
was affirmed on initial appeal.27 The case was then heard en banc and
in that opinion the judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, 2 8 with four
of the nine judges dissenting. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
en banc judgment was reversed in a single sentence opinion, citing an
earlier case that held actual knowledge of the peril is not essential when
29
a dangerous situation is foreseeable.
24.

McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959) (applying Oklahoma

law).
25. 2 F: HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 7, at 218 (noting criticism of the McCready decision
in Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J.
816, 857 (1962)); W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 102, at 669.
26. 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded, 388 U.S. 459 (1967), affirming
district court and remanding390 F.2d 353, cert. denied. 393 U.S. 858 (1968).
27. Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 34 U.S.L. W. 2339 (9th Cir. 1965) (unreported).
28. Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966).
29. 388 U.S. 459 (1967), citingAlbanese v. N.V. Nederle, Amerik. Stoomv. Maats., 346 F.2d
481, rev'd. 382 U.S. 2&3 (1965).
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This final decision by the Supreme Court seems clearly in accord
with general negligence principles. As a standard treatise remarked, the
instruction sought by the defendant in the Simpson case would require
that the "plaintiff's injury occur in the course of an intended or an
actually foreseen use of the product," and would be contrary to "the
'3
weight of modern authority.
A quite recent case on this point involved a fifteen-year-old boy who
dove into a vinyl-lined swimming pool thirty inches deep. In permitting
this case to go to the jury, the court stated: "[A] proper test to be applied
in determining the matter of 'abnormal use' is the reasonable foreseeability on the part of a manufacturer of the use to which his product
would be put. Both 'reasonableness' and 'foreseeability,' where reasonable minds may differ, are typical jury questions." 31 The jury found for
3
the plaintiff on this issue, and also found he did not assume the risk.
B.

Careless HandlingAs Abnormal Use

Sometimes the plaintiff is using the product for its intended purpose, or at least for a foreseeable purpose, but his manner of handling
it is careless. Often this careless manner of use involves contributory
negligence; would this also be classified as abnormal use? Although this
distinction may seem overly refined, it becomes quite significant because
in a strict liability case contributory negligence alone ordinarily does not
defeat recovery, whereas abnormal use and assumption of risk will bar
plaintiff's recovery. 33 The point may be illustrated by Proctor& Gamble
Manufacturing Co. v. Langley.Y Plaintiff used a home permanent solution for the normal purpose of waving her hair, but failed to follow
instructions for making a test curl and using liquid neutralizer. She also
disregarded a warning to discontinue use of the product if the test curls
broke easily or showed other signs of damage. Should this failure to
follow instructions and heed warnings be classed as an abnormal use,
or should the plaintiffs conduct be regarded as contributory negligence,
or perhaps as voluntary assumption of risk? When the plaintiff's failure
to read and comply with instructions or warnings is found to involve
simple objective contributory negligence, the plaintiff's negligent conduct ordinarily is not a bar in a strict liability case.3 The court in
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 7, at 219.
Colosimo v. May Dep't Store Co., 325 F. Supp. 609, 612 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
Id. The damage to the plaintiff was assessed at $100,000.
See notes 55-63 infra and accompanying text.
422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
See notes 64-67 infra and accompanying text.
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Langley upset a finding for plaintiff, stating that strict liability does not
mean that "a consumer may knowingly violate the plain unambiguous
instructions and ignore the warnings, then hold the makers, distributors
and sellers of a product liable in the face of the obvious misuse of the
product.131 By equating misuse of the product with voluntary assumption of risk rather than with contributory negligence, the court overcame
plaintiff's argument that defectiveness had been proved and only contributory negligence was involved. It should be noted that the case was an
unusually strong one for assumption of risk, since it appeared that the
plaintiff had read the directions and warnings and had understood them
to mean just what they said.
Suppose, as is usually the case, that there is no clear evidence that
the plaintiff has read and understood the instructions or warnings.
Should this conduct be classed as misuse, barring recovery, rather than
as contributory negligence? A leading text writer regards the failure to
follow instructions as a form of misuse.3 7 Once defectiveness has been
established, however, a careless failure to read and observe inadequate
instructions or warnings may involve only contributory negligence,
rather than unforeseeable misuse or conscious assumption of riskA5 In
that situation a broad assimilation of the plaintiff's failure to observe
instructions with the defense of abnormal use seems questionable.3 1
A Texas case decided shortly before Langley, for example, found
only contributory negligence when plaintiff, a beauty parlor owner,
failed to follow instructions in using a permanent wave solution, and
permitted use of the solution on her own bleached hair. The employee
disregarded a warning on the package that may not have indicated
adequately that bleached hair is not normal, and the court classified this
careless manner of use as contributory negligence. 0 A subsequent Texas
decision, however, McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co.,4" held that failure to
follow clear instructions concerning the proper size and air pressure of
automobile tires constituted misuse rather than contributory negligence,
36. 422 S.W.2d at 780.
37. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 102, at 669; ef. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt,
385 F.2d 841, 856 (5th Cir. 1967) (applying Texas law) (plaintiff's disregard of instructions included
an "unintended and unforeseen" mixture of 2 products, and was therefore classed as "abnormal
handling").
38. The subjective nature of assumption of risk is indicated in the text accompanying notes
149-51 infra.
39. See Noel, supra note 10, at 280-89.
40. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (rex. 1967). For a discussion of
contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability see text accompanying notes 68-116 infra.
41. 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968).
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assuming, of course, that the misuse was a proximate cause of the accident.
There are other cases not involving a failure to heed instructions and
warnings, that turn on whether plaintiff's conduct is classified as contributory negligence or as abnormal use of the product. In a case involving
careless use of a fragile grinding wheel, the court upheld a directed
verdict for defendant, stating that plaintiff was barred from recovery if
his use of the wheel was "ina manner or for a purpose for which it was
not designed." 4 This decision, like the one in Langley, demonstrates the
way in which the defendant may be protected from liability by the
classification of plaintiffs conduct as abnormal use rather than as contributory negligence. This kind of decision in substance indicates reluctance by a court to exclude completely the defense of objective contributory negligence. The developing difference of opinion concerning contributory negligence as a bar in strict liability cases will be considered
further in a subsequent section. 3
The parties' burden of pleading and proof may be significantly
affected if the court distinguishes abnormal use from contributory negligence. In Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 4 a case in which five airline
employees were killed during a test flight of defendant's airplane, the
decedents' representatives asserted strict liability of the manufacturer on
grounds of negligence of design and warnings, and also on grounds of
strict liabiity for supplying a defective product. Initially, defendant alleged contributory negligence; however, at the trial this defense was
withdrawn.4 5 Defendant did assert that the plane had been put into a
maneuver too violent for even a training flight, or that it had been flown
unskillfully by one of the occupants. Plaintiff responded that defendant's
concession that there was no evidence of contributory negligence in the
use of the plane by any particular decedent precluded further consideration by the jury of the issue of misuse. In rejecting this contention the
court said:
[E]ven under the principle of strict liability the manufacturer is liable only if the
plaintiff proves the accident was caused by delivery of the article in a "defective
condition".... The inference of the existence and the causality of a defect would
indeed be bolstered if the manufacturer admitted that improper use played no part
in the accident. But Boeing's withdrawal of the contributory negligence defense for
lack of affirmative proof as to who was misusing the plane in no way conceded that
the plane was not being misused; it remained for the jury to decide whether the
42. Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 354 Mo. 1147, 1150, 193 S.W.2d 581, 584 (1946).
43. See text accompanying notes 68-116 infra.
44. 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965).
45. 337 F.2d at 942.
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plaintiffs had sustained their burden of showing that the crash was due to a defect
rather than to negligent operation or some other cause for which the manufacturer
would not be responsible."

As the above quotation indicates, proof of misuse in an action based
either on negligence or strict liability is a means of establishing that the
product was not characterized by a defect that caused the accident.
The case of Preston v. Up-Right Inc., 7 illustrates the difficulty of
separating abnormal use from contributory negligence. An aluminum
scaffold with legs mounted on locking caster wheels was being used by
the plaintiff. Although the wheels were locked, the scaffold moved, causing plaintiff to fall from a ladder placed against or near the scaffold. The
trial judge instructed the jury, with reference to the abnormal use of a
scaffold, that they could consider "those uses of the article which would
be foreseeable by the manufacturer at the time the article was placed on
the market." 4 He also instructed, however, that the article must have
been "used reasonably for the purpose for which it was designed and
intended to be used," 49 but declined to instruct that contributory negligence was not a defense in an action based on strict liability in tort. The
jury found for defendant, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that
the refusal to instruct that contributory negligence was not a defense
constituted harmless error because no contributory negligence was found
to be present. No attempt was made to distinguish between use for an
abnormal purpose and use for an appropriate purpose in a careless
manner. If no distinction between these matters is to be made, then the
instructions do seem sufficiently favorable to the plaintiff.
C.

The Abnormal User

Consideration of the abnormal use doctrine would not be complete
without some discussion of the abnormal user-a user allergic to the
defendant's product. There has been much discussion of the extent to
which allergic, or abnormally sensitive users of products should be protected by warnings or other means.50 Today courts are quite unlikely to
dismiss a case on the ground that the plaintiff's sensitivity, rather than
the product, was the only proximate cause of the accident; actually both
the product and the sensitivity are immediate causes of the injury. Con46.

Id.

47. 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966).
48. Id. at 640, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
49. Id.
50. See 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY §§ 28-31A[201 (1970); Noel,
The Duty to Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 VAND. L. REv. 331 (1959).
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sequently, while there still is no duty to alter the product to make it safe
for the abnormal user, an increasing number of cases impose a duty to
warn of the presence of "strong sensitizers."' 1
The duty to warn allergic users may arise in breach of warranty,
on negligence grounds, or under strict tort liability. The duty does not
arise with reference to the common allergies such as those to milk or
citrus fruits, for which the harm is trivial, and the risk ordinarily is
known to the susceptible person. Even for serious allergic reactions from
chemical sensitizers about which the plaintiff has never heard, the duty
to warn does not extend to isolated users, but only to a plaintiff who is
found to be a member of an appreciable group. The problem is to
determine when the court will regard the plaintiff as a member of an
appreciable, substantial, or significant group. In making that determination, the more recent decisions consider not only the percentage of users
affected, but also the gravity of foreseeable injuries and the difficulty of
embodying effective protection in labels or the like. 52 The size of the class
needed before a duty to warn arises, assuming an injury of given seriousness, is declining, but there still are many recent cases in which a duty
to warn has not been established because the plaintiff is regarded as a
more or less isolated user.53 When the defendant states expressly that his
product contains only noninjurious materials, however, this representation will protect even an isolated allergic user. 4
By way of summary, it appears that abnormal use of a product is
generally accepted as preventing recovery because the harm is regarded
as caused by the abnormal use rather than by a defect in the product.
Ordinarily whether a particular use is to be regarded as abnormal is left
to the jury, but occasionally the court will find an abnormal use as a
51.

An up-to-date definition of a "strong sensitizer" is contained in the Federal Hazardous

Substance Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73 (1964), as amended, Child Protection Act of 1966,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-65, 1273 (Supp. V, 1970), providing: "The term 'strong sensitizer' means a
substance which will cause on normal living tissue through an allergic or photodynamic process a
hypersensitivity which becomes evident on reapplication of the same substance and which is designated as such by the'Secretary. Before designating any substance as a strong sensitizer, the Secretary, upon consideration of the frequency of occurrence and severity of the reaction, shall find that
the substance has a significant potential for causing hypersensitivity." A more complete definition
of a "strong allergic sensitizer" can be found in 21 C.F.R. § 191.1(i) (1971).
52. See, e.g., Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying Massachusetts law).
53. See Noel, supra note 10, at 293 (negligence cases); id. at 294 (warranty and strict tort
cases).
54. McLachlan v. Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 41 Del. 378, 22 A.2d 851 (1941). Furthermore, a plaintiff has recovered on an express warranty that an insecticide was "not poisonous to
human beings" by showing the product was poisonous to him, although it may not have been to
other users. Simpson v. American Oil Co., 219 N.C. 595, 14 S.E.2d 638 (1941).
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matter of law if a contrary finding would be manifestly unreasonable.
The older decisions sometimes gave a directed verdict for the defendant
on the ground that a particular use is unintended or not actually known,
but the more recent cases recognize that the test is whether the particular
use is foreseeable. It has become increasingly clear that if the supplier,
as an expert in his field, could by exercising due care have foreseen a
particular use of his product, he is not protected when he in fact did not
foresee such a use. Furthermore, the supplier is not protected when the
consumer is unusually sensitive, if he should have foreseen harm from
the product to an appreciable class of allergic users.
III.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

As the preceding section indicates, it is an essential part of the
plaintiff's case to show that the defendant's product is defective, and that
plaintiff's harm resulted from the defective product. Furthermore, the
plaintiff must show that his use of the product was normal or at least
foreseeable; otherwise the plaintiff's abnormal use of the product will be
regarded as the sole proximate cause of the accident, and the plaintiff
will not be able to establish defectiveness and causation.
When the defense of contributory negligence is alleged, however, the
burden of pleading and proving the negligence ordinarily rests on the
defendant. 55 If the defendant can show that the plaintiff's own negligence
is the sole proximate cause of the accident, it is then clear that the
defendant supplier is not liable for the accident. In a case involving a
combustible night gown, for example, plaintiff was injured by her own
carelessness while smoking in bed, and the court denied recovery. It
found that plaintiff's injuries were caused solely by her own negligence
in smoking in bed, late at night, and while in a semi-conscious state
induced by the taking of a sleeping pill.rl
55. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 65, at 416.
56. Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962) (applying Colorado
law). There is, however, an unusual rule in Tennessee that "remote" contributory negligence is to
-be considered in mitigating damages. See Comment, Remote ContributoryNegligence: A Tennessee Concept, 22 TENN. L. REv. 1030 (1953). See also Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25
N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969) (application of proximate cause principles
to defendant's strict liability). It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the factors used in
determining the issue of proximate causation. It seems likely, however, that if contributory negligence is to be given effect in a strict liability or warranty case, the usual rules will be applied in
determining whether the plaintiff's contributory negligence is "proximate." See Rasmus v. A. 0.
Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Natale v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 282,
182 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1959); Razey v. J.B. Colt Co., 106 App. Div. 103, 94 N.Y.S. 59 (1905).
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Distinction Between Contributory Negligence and Assumption of
Risk

Because of the differing effects that the plaintiffs conduct may have
on his recovery, it is necessary to distinguish contributory negligence
from voluntary assumption of risk as well as from abnormal use. As
discussed above, abnormal use is use of the product in a way not reasonably foreseeable by the supplier,5 7 while voluntary assumption of risk is
a willingness or consent by the plaintiff to use a product he actually
knows is defective and dangerous.5 s When the acceptance of the possibility of danger is unreasonable, voluntary assumption of risk also constitutes one kind of contributory negligence. The kind of contributory
negligence most commonly involved in products liability cases, however,
consists simply of the plaintiff's failure to discover the defect or the
danger in the product, or of a failure to take precautions against the
possibility that a dangerous defect may exist. The comments to section
402A of the Restatement set forth the difference between this kind of
contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk, and conclude
that only the latter is a valid defense in a strict liability case:
Contributorynegligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is not
based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict
liability cases . . . applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense
when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the
form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name
assumption
of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liabil59
ity.

Perhaps the most considered decision in support of the Restatement
view is that of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Williams v. Brown
Manufacturing Co.6" Plaintiff was standing at the rear of a trenching
machine when it struck an underground obstruction, lurched backward,
and injured the plaintiff. It was claimed that certain safety devices would
have prevented the lurch, and that there should have been a warning to
operate the machine only from the side. The complaint included two
counts, one based on strict liability in tort, the other on negligence. As
required in Illinois, the negligence count contained allegations that the
plaintiff had exercised due care, but the strict liability count contained
no such allegation. After a verdict for plaintiff, defendant asserted on
57. See text accompanying notes 11, 24-32 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 149-51 infra.
59. REsTAmTEmEr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
60. 45111. 2d 418,261 N.E.2d305 (1970).

4972]

DEFENSES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY

appeal that the plaintiff's strict liability count should have been stricken
because of failure to allege freedom from contributory negligence. The
supreme court in its initial opinion reversed the trial court and held that
the plaintiff must plead the absence of contributory negligence in a strict
liability case as well as in a negligence case.6 ' The court reasoned that a
product is not "unreasonably dangerous," as required by the
Restatement, 2 if a plaintiff exercising reasonable care for his own safety,
in an objective sense, could have discovered the defect. A rehearing,
however, was granted, and in its final opinion the court adopted the
Restatement view as "a more appropriate and workable framework for
treatment of plaintiffs' recovery-barring conduct in strict product liability cases." 13 Accordingly it was held that failure to meet the objective
standard of due care would not defeat the plaintiff's recovery; therefore,
there was no need to plead exercise of due care in a count based on strict
tort liability.
The opinion goes on to hold that assumption of risk by the plaintiff
is a defense, with defendant having the burden of proof on that matter.
Recognizing that it is often difficult for a defendant to prove conscious
assumption of risk, the court remanded the case for a new trial, stating
that the defense of voluntary assumption of risk is not necessarily obviated by the plaintiff's own uncontradicted statement that he did not
subjectively realize the risk.
B.

Rationale and JudicialAuthority Concerning Contributory Negligence As a Bar

In its holding that contributory negligence is not an automatic bar,
the Illinois court observed that all other jurisdictions which have adopted
the theory of strict liability in substance have decided to follow the
Restatement distinction 4 between objective contributory negligence in
failing to discover the defect in the product or to guard against the
possibility of its existence, and subjective voluntary assumption of risk.
At the time of the decision, the court's conclusion about the state of the
authorities was substantially correctA5 There have been a number of
61. Id. at 424, 261 N.E.2d at 309;see Peopleexrel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 111. 2d
180, 196, 226 N.E.2d 6, 16 (1967).
62. For text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A see note 5 supra,
63. 45 II1.2d at 425,261 N.E.2d at 309.
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
65. Bronson v. Club Comanche, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 21 (D.V.1. 1968); Estabrook v. J.C.
Penney Co., 105 Ariz. 302, 464 P.2d 325 (1970); Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Eng'r Co., 243
Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966); DeFelice v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 164,
255 A.2d 636 (Super. Ct. 1969); Baker v. Rosemurgy, 4 Mich. App. 195, 144 N.W.2d 660 (1966);
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additional decisions to the same effect,66 but at least two courts apparently have rejected the Restatement view." To understand why various
courts have accepted or rejected the Restatement conclusion that contri-

butory negligence is not a bar to an action based on strict liability, it is
necessary to analyze the reasons underlying the strict liability doctrine
and the way in which contributory negligence bears on these issues.
I. Administration of the Risk.-A major factor that led the Illi-

nois court to find that objective contributory negligence was not a bar
was its earlier recognition that the basis of strict liability is "the justice
of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the
profit. ' 68 In the Brown Manufacturing Co. case, the court concluded

that "the policy considerations which led us to adopt strict liability in
tort compel the elimination of 'contributory negligence' as a bar to
recovery. 169 Although strict liability requires the product to be "unreasonably dangerous" as well as defective under section 402A of the

Restatement, this does not compel a conclusion that no unreasonable
danger is present when the harm can be avoided by ordinary prudence,
because many safety devices and warnings are needed and provided
mainly because people do not always act reasonably. Consequently,
when strict liability is based primarily on concepts of administration of
the risk, contributory negligence seems inappropriate as a bar to recovery.
2. Express Warranty or Representation.-Likewise,when empha-

sis is placed on concepts of misrepresentation 7° or warranty 71 in arriving

at a basis for strict liability, there is much to be said for finding that
contributory negligence is not a bar to the plaintiff's action. The defendant who has warranted or represented that his product is free from
Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc.,
53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966);
Richard v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 104 R.I. 267, 243 A.2d 910 (1968); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co.
v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967). But see Dippel v. Sciano,'37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967).
66. Benson v. Beloit Corp., 443 F.2d 839, 840 (9th Cir. 1971) (applying Oregon law);
Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying New Mexico
law); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329-30 (Alas. 1970); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v.
Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681, 689 (Ind. 1970); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 43, 171
N.W.2d 201, 211 (1969); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 836, 454 P.2d 205, 208 (1969).
67. Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 266 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1970); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.
2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). The cases are discussed in text at notes 99-103 infra.
68. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111.2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
69.
70.
71.

45 Ill.2d at 426, 261 N.E.2d at 310.
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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dangerous defects should not be able to say that the injured plaintiff was
foolish to rely on the warranties or representations. This is particularly
true when the warranties or representations relied on by the plaintiff are
72
express, whether stated privately or made to the general public.
The point may be illustrated by one of the first strict liability cases
involving express representations, Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Co.73 The
manufacturer's advertising emphasized that the car was "a rugged fortress of safety," improved with a seamless steel roof making it a solid
unit with the body shell. Actually the roof was made of two separate
parts welded together, with jagged metal drippings all along the seam.
Plaintiff became interested in defendant's car because of its "safety
top." After he purchased one of the cars it overturned as a result of his
own negligent driving, and his head was injured when it came into contact with the jagged seam. In rejecting the defense of contributory negligence, the court said:
It is undoubtedly true that the negligence of the driver caused the car to overturn,
but defendant's representations were not for the purpose of avoiding an accident,
but in order to avoid or lessen the serious damages that might result therefrom. . . . The particular construction of the roof of defendant's car was represented as protection against the consequences of just such careless driving as actually took place. Once the anticipated overturning of the car did occur, it would
be illogical to excuse defendant from responsibility for these very consequences. 4

The court referred to defendant's conduct as involving falsity and
deliberate misrepresentation, implying that scienter or intent to deceive
was present. This might mean only that the supplier of the product made
an express warranty, and that it was established that the particular item
sold to the plaintiff did not conform to the representation. A finding of
scienter in this situation would be in accord with the general law of
misrepresentation, under which a person who asserts a fact as being
within his own knowledge, when he does not actually know whether what
he says is true, may be found to possess the intent to deceive. 75 It is not
clear that the court would have held the same way if the case had
involved a breach of an implied rather than an express warranty or
representation. 76 When express representations are present, it seems clear
that the defense of contributory negligence would be anomalous under
72.
73.

2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 16.01(3), at 3-30.
290 Mich. 683, 689, 288 N.W. 309, 310 (1939).

74. Id. at 692, 288 N.W. at 312.
75. W. PRossER, supra note 6, § 107, at 701.
76.

See text accompanying notes 83-100 infra (concerning the effect of contributory negli-

gence in an implied warranty situation).
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the modern law of misrepresentation,77 at least when scienter is found.
3. Strict Liability Based on Problems of Proof.-When attention
is turned to other bases for strict liability, the reasons for rejecting
objective contributory negligence as a defense may be less convincing.
One policy that underlies strict liability relates to the difficulty of proving negligence in a products liability case.78 Assuming the plaintiff can
meet the substantial burden of proving that the product is defective, it
may be even more difficult to show that the defect arose through negligence. This proof would involve showihg a failure of due care on the part
of one or more of a series of persons who worked on, inspected, or
controlled the production of the particular product during a complicated
manufacturing process. None of the persons suspected can be expected
to cooperate with efforts to show himself or his employer at fault. In
many products liability cases the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or other
comparable doctrines that permit extensive use of circumstantial evidence, may be unavailable, and the plaintiff may be faced with insurmountable problems of proof. As Dean Wade has pointed out, the difference between strict liability and negligence is less than is generally supposed.79 Referring to the need to establish both defectiveness and unreasonable danger, he states:
In essence, strict liability in this sense is not different from negligence per se.
Selling a dangerously unsafe product is the equivalent of negligence regardless of
the defendant's conduct in letting it become unsafe. This is exactly the situation
when a pure-food statute is construed to make its violation negligence per se; if the
food is not wholesome, the statute is violated and the defendant is negligent ...
Thus, a court which appears to be taking the radical step of changing from negligence to strict liability for products is really doing nothing more than adopting a
rule that selling a dangerously unsafe chattel is negligence within itself.?0

Assuming that a principal policy underlying the development of
strict liability is that negligence may often be present even though it
cannot be proved, how does this relate to contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff in a products liability case? When the doctrines of
negligence per se or res ipsa loquitur are applied, it is clear that objective
contributory negligence ordinarily bars plaintiff's recovery, or, in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, that this negligence diminishes dam77. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 108, at 717. See also Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal.
App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 96-97 infra.
78. See Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (imposing liability without proof
of fault in a defective food case); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 422, 398 S.W.2d 240,
250 (1966).
79. Wade, supra note 2, at 14.

80. Id. (citations omitted).
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ages. It is arguable that contributory negligence likewise should bar, or
at least diminish, recovery in strict liability cases. So it has been said,
"The fact that there is such a concept as strict liability, in the sense that
proof of negligence is not required, in no way requires that contributory
negligence not be a defense." 81 The same writer then urges that in strict
liability cases based on warranty a comparative negligence rule should
2
be adopted.1
4. Implied Warranty.-Although the authors of the leading treatise on products liability do not adopt contributory negligence as a
defense in express warranty cases, they take a different view when implied warranty is involved:
Turning to implied warranty, it is unreasonable to require the non-commercial
consumer to make any sort of detailed or expert inspection. However, with this in
mind but accepting the view that products liability in warranty is basically liability
in tort, contributory negligence should be a defense to breach of implied warranty
just as in the negligence cases. Otherwise, we impose the same strict liability for
products as presently exists

. . . with

respect to wild animals and other ultrahazar-

dous activities. It is one thing to say that there is strict liability in the sense that
proof of negligence should not be required; it is quite another to say that contributory negligence

. . .

should not be a defense. This, in substance, is what the cases

actually may be saying.4

While the above passage is concerned primarily with the failure to
inspect, the reference to problems of proof of negligence as a principal
basis for strict liability suggests that the defense of contributory negligence should be available not orly when the plaintiff negligently fails to
discover a defect, but also when he fails to guard against the possibility
of its existence. Examples of failure to guard against possible defects are
furnished by high-speed driving on a tire not actually known to be
defective or the conduct of the plaintiff who carelessly overturned his car
in the Bahiman case. 84 When the Restatement view" is followed, however, plaintiffs negligence in failing to guard against the possibility of a
defect would not bar the claim of the negligent driver, unless this was
the sole proximate cause of the injury, any more than this negligence
would bar a plaintiff who fails to inspect the defective product.
It has been said that it is irrational to hold that contributory negli81.
ranty, 52
82.
83.

Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in WarMINN. L. REV. 627, 648 (1968).
Id. at 652.
2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 16.01(3), at 3-30 to -31 (citations

omitted).
84.

See Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); W. PROSSER,

supra note 6, § 102, at 670.
85.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs

§

402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
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gence "is a defense in a products case when the plaintiff alleges negligence but that the same conduct does not constitute a defense when the
plaintiff pleads breach of implied warranty or strict liability in tort."'8 6
The writer goes on to observe, however, that a failure to discover may
be considerably more excusable when the purchaser has been led into
reliance without inspection by advertising that misrepresents the quality
of the goods.8 7 It is well established that contributory negligence is a bar
in a products liability case based on negligence even though the plaintiffs negligence consists of a careless failure to discover a defect in the
product or to guard against the possibility of its existence. 8
it is clear that the official comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code regard objective contributory negligence as well as assumption of
risk as a significant factor in assessing defendant's liability, particularly
with regard to failure to inspect. The comments state that "if the buyer
discovers the defect and uses the goods anyway, or if he unreasonably
fails to examine the goods before he uses them, [the] injuries may be
found to result from his own action rather than proximately from a
breach of warranty." 9 The code section to which the above comment
refers deals only with failure to inspect before the sales,9" but the above
quoted comment discusses failure to discover defects at any time before
use. 91 Furthermore, another comment, which relates to consequential
damages, states: "Where the injury involved follows the use of goods
without discovery of the defect causing the damage, the question of
proximate cause turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use
the goods without such inspection as would have revealed the defects. If
it was not reasonable for him to do so, or if he did in fact discover the
defect prior to his use, the injury would not proximately result from the
breach of warranty. '9 2 It is clear that the section to which the comment
above quoted has reference does not apply simply to the buyer's conduct
before the contract. So in substance the official comments to the Code
86. Epstein, ProductsLiability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV.
267, 284.
87. Id.
88. MacKay v. Crown Drug Co., 420 P.2d 883 (Okla. 1966); 1 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2:12 1, at 382 (1961); W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 107, at 670.
89. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3)(b), Comment 8.
90. Epstein, supra note 86, at 276.
91. See Comment, Strict ProductsLiability-Its Application and Meaning, 21 Sw. L.J. 629,
645 (1967). The section involved, 2-316(3)(b), states: "[W]hen the buyer before entering into the
contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought
in the circumstances to have revealed to him."
92. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, Comment 5.
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have taken the position, at least in the case of a buyer, that recovery
should be barred by failure to make a reasonable inspection of the
product for defects, whenever the failure is a "proximate cause" of the
13
injury.
Turning to the judicial decisions, it undoubtedly is true, as asserted
by Prosser, that actual holdings of courts tend to support the view that
where "the negligence of the plaintiff consists only in failure to discover
the danger in the product, or to take precautions against its possible
existence, it has uniformly been held that it is not a bar to an action for
breach of warranty." 94 This conclusion is supported by a subsequent
writer who says that no reported case has actually held that objective
contributory negligence is a defense to a warranty action.95 As will be
shown, however, there is a considerable tendency in more recent cases
to find that a careless failure to discover the danger, or to take precautions against its possible existence, is a bar to recovery.
Perhaps the leading implied warranty decision that clearly rejects
the defense of contributory negligence in failing to inspect for defects is
Kassouf v. Lee Bros.96 Plaintiff was eating a candy bar made by the
defendant. Without looking at the bar, she unwrapped it with one hand,
broke off pieces, and started eating them. She noticed from the outset
that the bar had a peculiar taste, but thought this was because she had
not eaten all day. After consuming about a third of the bar, she discovered that it was covered with webbing, eggs, and crawling worms, into
which she had bitten. In appealing from a verdict for plaintiff, defendant
urged that the trial court had refused erroneously to instruct that the
plaintiff was barred if she failed to take reasonable precautions for her
own safety in handling, inspection, and consumption of the candy. In
rejecting the defendant's contention the court stated:
It is our decision that contributory negligence would not be a defense ...
Contributory negligence, in general, is a defense only to actions grounded on negligence ...
Appellants make the point that the law for breach of implied warranty sounds

in tort rather than in contract. From the fact that the action sounds in tort

. . .

it

does not follow that contributory negligence is a defense. We cite two examples of
tort cases where contributory negligence is no defense. Where defendant has an
absolute liability because of an ultrahazardous activity, an instruction on contribu-

93. See also id. § 2-314. Comment 13, which states: "Action by the buyer following an
examination of the goods which ought to have indicated the defect complained of can be shown as
a matter bearing on whether the breach itself was the cause of the ihjury."
94. See Prosser, The Fallof the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.
791,838 (1966).
95. Epstein, supra note 86, at 275.
96. 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962).
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tory negligence, phrased in the language used in an ordinary negligence case, is
improper. . . . Fraud and deceit is a tort but contributory negligence is no defense
thereto.97

This case seems to be in accord with the current weight of authority.9"
One recent products liability case, however, clearly found that contributory negligence is a defense to an action based on both warranty
and strict tort grounds. In Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,99 plaintiff
was injured while using a radial-arm power saw. He alleged that the saw
was defective because the blade would extend over the edge of the table.
Rejecting plaintiff's contention that contributory negligence was not a
bar, the New Hampshire court said, speaking first about strict tort
liability and then about warranty:
The record before us does not reveal what knowledge the plaintiff in this case
had of the alleged defect or danger. However, we reaffirm the doctrine that failure
to discover or foresee dangers which the ordinary person would have discovered or
foreseen as well as negligent conduct after discovery of the danger and in use of the
product will constitute a defense to an action based on strict liability ...
Contrary to the contention of the plaintiff, we hold that contributory negligence is a defense to an action for breach of warranty . . . in the same manner as
in actions based on strict liability as above described.10

If the plaintiff had been using the saw for only a short period, he could
have failed to discover the defective design and to become aware of the
danger; in fact, there was no evidence of subjective appreciation of risk.
This decision still bars recovery under the Restatement section 402A
concept of strict liability if by ordinary prudence the plaintiff could have
discovered the danger, and likewise places a duty on the plaintiff to make
a reasonable inspection when the action is based on breach of implied
warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. The court's views are
in harmony with the comments to the Code discussed above, but out of
harmony with the Restatement section 402A, comment n.
5. Comparative Negligence and Contributory Negligence.-The
only other decision known to specifically give effect to objective contribditory negligence in an action based on strict tort liability is Dippel
v. Sciano,1 1 decided in Wisconsin, a comparative negligence jurisdic97. Id. at 572, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
98. Epstein, supra note 86, at 274 (states that Kassouf represents the majority view). See also
I R. HURSH, supra note 88, § 3:9, at 416 (Supp. 1971) ("The weight-which is hardly a great
weight-of authority appears to be on the side of the view that negligence on the part of a user of
a product is no defense in a breach of warranty action against the manufacturer or seller of the
product"); Comment, Products Liability: Forthe Defense-ContributoryFault, 33 TENN. L. REV.
464,465-66 (1966).
99. 266 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1970).
100. Id. at 857-58 (citations omitted).
101. 37 Wis. 2d443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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tion. Plaintiff was a patron in a tavern, and while helping to move a
pool table, was injured when the front leg assembly of the table collapsed, and the slate top fell on the plaintiff's foot. Although the suit
was brought on a warranty theory, the court treated the case as based
on strict tort liability and concluded that "[t]he defense of contributory
negligence is available to the seller," stating:
It might be contended that the strict liability of the seller of a defective product
is not negligence and therefore cannot be compared with the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff. The liability imposed is not grounded upon a failure to exercise
ordinary care with its necessary element of foreseeability; it is much more akin to
negligence per se ...
Strict liability in tort . . . now arises in this state by virtue of a decision of
this court. If this same liability were imposed for violation of a statute it is difficult
to perceive why we would not consider it negligence per se for the purpose of
applying the comparative negligence statute just as we have done so many times in
0 2
other cases involving the so-called "safety statutes."

Thus the Wisconsin court, like the one in New Hampshire,"' indicated that contributory negligence is a defense and did not limit the
defense to cases of assumption of risk."0 4 As a concurring opinion in the
Dippel case suggested, it is arguable that the court in fact regarded the
conduct of the defendant supplier as negligence, rather than as conduct
involving strict liability under Restatement section 402A. The majority
of the court, however, placed its reliance on section 402 of the
Restatement. That section is based to a considerable extent on concepts
of representation and ability to administer the risk, with no special
reference to problems of proof or negligence per se. 0 5 The Restatement
notwithstanding, the Dippel decision supplies a precedent for giving a
limited effect to contributory negligence in a strict liability case.
6. Comparison with Abnormally Dangerous or Ultrahrzardous
Activities.-It is apparent from the cases considered that while the
Restatement view of contributory negligence has in general been followed, a few decisions, and several writers, are unwilling to conclude that
objective contributory negligence is immaterial in products liability
cases based on strict tort or warranty. The only reason given in
Restatement comment n for disregarding contributory negligence is that
since "the liability with which this section [402A] is concerned is not
Id. at 461-62, 155 N.W.2d at 63-65.
103. Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 266 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1970).
104. There was no indication that plaintiff assumed a risk that the front leg assembly of the
pool table might collapse, and it is puzzling to see the Dippel case cited for the proposition that
only voluntary assumption of risk will relieve the defendant of liability. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 6. § 103, at 671 n.85.
105. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 349 (1965).
102.
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based on negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied
to strict liability cases [section 524] applies." The section of the
Restatement referred to-section 524-deals with contributory fault in
abnormally dangerous activities. It is there said that the only contributory negligence that bars the plaintiff's recovery is "knowingly and
unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk" from the dangerous activity.106 The matter is made more specific by an illustration involving a
driver harmed while trying to pass a truck carrying explosives and
plainly marked "Danger, Dynamite." The driver, intent on passing the
truck, negligently fails to observe the sign, and causes a collision and an
explosion by negligently trying to pass the truck through too narrow a
space. The illustration concludes that the plaintiff is not barred from
recovery by his negligent failure to see the sign, or by his negligent
driving past the truck, but is barred if he has read the sign and negligently drives past in the same way, because he has then knowingly and
unreasonably subjected himself to risk of harm from an explosion.
It is not entirely clear why negligence in failing to see the sign before
negligently colliding with the truck should not affect the plaintiff's recovery. In his discussion of the general problem, Prosser states:
It frequently is said that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense in cases of strict liability. This involves the seemingly illogical position that
the fault of the plaintiff will relieve the defendant of liability when he is negligent,
but not when he is innocent. The explanation must lie in part in the element of wilful
creation of an unreasonable risk to others by abnormal conduct which is inherent
in most of the strict liability cases; and in part in the policy which places the
absolute responsibility for preventing the harm upon the defendant, whether his
conduct is regarded as fundamentally anti-social, or he is considered merely to be
in a better position to transfer the loss to the community. 0 7

The considerations above mentioned emphasize "wilful creation of
an unreasonable risk to others by abnormal conduct" and ability to
distribute the loss as the principal grounds for the rule of strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities. When the grounds for strict liability
for defective products are examined, emphasis often is placed on the
difficulties of proof or on warranty concepts, as well as on ability to
control risks and administer losses. There is no thought that the manufacture and supply of consumer goods is abnormal or unusually dangerous conduct. It is not at all clear, therefore, that the policies behind strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities are the same as those relied
on by courts moving to strict products liability. In view of the differences
in policy grounds, it may be that objective contributory negligence
106.
107.

Seeid. § 524 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
W. PROSSER,supra note 6, § 79, at 522.
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should not be excluded in strict products liability cases in the same
manner as under the rule dealing with abnormally dangerous activities,
which are carried on by a comparatively few persons and involve comparatively few mishaps. The great expansion of claims and suits for
injury from defective products suggests that something more than the
theoretical analogy to ultrahazardous activities should be considered in
determining the effect of contributory negligence. If the plaintiff could
have discovered the defect in a dangerous product with little effort, it
may be that his failure to inspect should be a defense in this new and
expanding area of liability.
7. Dislike of Contributory Negligence As a Complete Bar.-The
defense of contributory fault as a complete bar to actions based on
negligence has long been under attack,"' and this factor may well have
influenced the courts that have rejected contributory negligence as a
defense to strict products liability. When the doctrine of comparative
negligence is available,' however, a court that wishes to give some effect
to plaintiffs negligence may be able to use it to reduce damages. In
Chapman v. Brown, n0 for example, a federal court held that Hawaii
would consider contributory negligence as mitigating damages in a strict
liability case."' Strict products liability has been developed mainly to
provide more protection for the consumer than is available under negligence principles. That protection is not seriously impaired by reducing
the damages of a plaintiff who has at hand the means to protect himself,
and nevertheless negligently contributes to his own injury. Consumer
protection is intended, according to some of the strict liability opinions,
for those unable to protect themselves from the hazards of modern
mechanical and chemical products. 12 As a logical extension of this principle, a leading case in the area of strict liability protection for bystand108. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW & CONTEMP, PROB, 476, 483 (1936); see F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 7, § 22.3, at 1207; W.
PROSSER, supra note 6. § 67, at 433.
109. The use of comparative negligence is increasing. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 67, at
436; see Special Committee on Automobile Reparations, Recommendations, 94 A.B.A. REP. 559
(1969) (favoring a limited sort of comparative negligence rule).
110. 198 F. Supp. 78 (D.C. Hawaii), affd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
Ill. Since the date of the Chapman decision, Hawaii has adopted a comparative negligence
rule. W. PROSSER, supra note 6,§ 6,at 436,
112. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c at 349
(1965) (observing that the buying public is "forced to rely on the seller"); Prosser, The Assault
Upon the CitadeltStrict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1960) (referring to
defects in "products which consumers must buy, and against which they are helpless to protect
themselves").
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ers, Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,"3 found that the "public policy" that protects users of a defective car should also protect occupants
of an oncoming vehicle who are injured "without any fault of their
own.""' This language suggests that if the driver of the oncoming vehicle
had negligently contributed to the collision with the defective car, some
account might have been taken of the plaintiff's own negligence.
If in fact a plaintiff, whether a bystander or a product user, can
protect himself by due care in a particular situation, it would seem that
the supplier should at least have the benefit of some reduction of the
damages when a jury finds contributory negligence -something the jury
is not likely to do except when the evidence establishing the plaintiff's
negligence is quite clear. The Wisconsin case, Dippel v. Sciano," shows
that while it may be difficult theoretically to balance the plaintiff's
contributory negligence against the defendant's strict liability, a comp'arative negligence jurisdiction can accomplish this without practical
difficulty. Since both defectiveness and unreasonable danger must be
established for liability, the jury ordinarily will infer a certain amount
of "fault" on the part of the defendant, and this "fault" can be balanced
against the plaintiffs contributory negligence in assessing damages. As
a practical matter, even when told that contributory negligence is not a
bar in a strict products liability case, a jury may diminish damages if
they believe that the accident was due partly to the plaintiffs carelessness.
To summarize, it is clear that in contributory negligence situations,
as in those involving abnormal use, causation factors are significant. If
it is found that the plaintiff's negligence is the sole proximate cause of
the accident, this conduct quite evidently will bar recovery. When the
plaintiff's contributory negligence, along with a defect in the product, is
found to be one of the proximate causes of the accident, it is the prevailing view that the plaintiff still can recover in a strict liability case as
distinguished from one based on negligence. This prevailing view is more
uniformly applied in strict tort decisions than it is in cases based on
warranty, and in the warranty cases a few decisions and a great deal of
dicta refer to contributory negligence as a bar. Even under the strict tort
theory, however, there are a few decisions that dissent from the generally
accepted rule."' It may be that more courts will become more dissatisfied with the Restatement view. Arguments that objective contributory
113. 70 Cal. 2d 578,451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
114. Id. at 586,451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
115. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
116. See text accompanying notes 99-105 supra.
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negligence should be considered have weight, particularly when strict
liability is based primarily on problems of proof, in jurisdictions in
which contributory negligence is used simply to diminish recovery, or
when a court is seeking to smooth out conflicts between tort law and the
Uniform Commercial Code.
The majority rule that contributory negligence should be disregarded in a strict products liability case has apparent simplicity, but it
becomes much less clear cut when the doctrines of abnormal use or
assumption of risk are applied to reasonably foreseeable uses or to risks
not actually realized. Courts that are definitely attached, however, to
strict liability based on administration of risk or express representation
concepts, or that are impressed with the doctrinal analogy to strict
liability for ultrahazardous activities, are likely to adhere to the
Restatement view.

IV.

ASSUMPTION OF RISK

While rejecting contributory negligence as a bar to recovery, it is
clear that many courts have recognized that assumption of risk is a
defense in products liability cases.11 7 Perhaps the best description of the
doctrine is contained in the section of the tentative draft of the
Restatement that deals with assumption of risk as a defense to negligent
conduct."" The Restatement takes the position that assumption of risk
is a matter of defense with the burden of proof on the defendant,"' but
Dean Wade has urged that assumption of risk is inappropriate as a
separate defense.' The Restatement further indicates that assumption
of risk may be express or implied; that it involves knowledge and appreciation of the risk; and that the assumption of risk must be voluntary
with no reasonable alternative action available to the plaintiff. It also
points out that the defense bars recovery for defendant's violation of a
statute unless a policy of the statute to place the entire responsibility on
the defendant would be defeated.
117. See notes 64-67 supra.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS §§ 496A-G (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963). The provisions of this section are equally applicable as a defense to strict liability as shown by the cross
reference in the strict liability section to conduct that passes under the name of assumption of risk.
See id. § 402A. comment n at 356 (1965).
119. Id. §§ 496A-G (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
120. See id., Explanatory Notes § 893, at 70. See also Memoranda of L. Eldredge & W.
Malone, in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 893, at 72, 76 (Tent. Draft
No. 9. 1963).
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Express Disclaimers

Assumption of risk means basically that the plaintiff has consented
in advance to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward
him, and has agreed to take his chances of injury from a known risk.' 2 '
Occasionally in a products case the parties explicitly agree that the
defendant shall not be liable for conduct that would otherwise constitute
negligence or grounds for some form of strict liability. The express
agreement is usually accomplished by the use of disclaimers, for example, a product sold "as is," or with a statement that a warranty is given
in lieu of all other warranties, express or implied. Express disclaimers
of this kind may be described as involving assumption of risk. 2
The validity of these disclaimers has become increasingly subject to
question in products liability cases. Perhaps the leading decision is
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., i2' holding unenforceable the
exculpatory provisions of the uniform warranty of the Automobile Manufacturer's Association. 24 Many courts have followed Henningsen,
which has been described as dealing "a lethal blow not only to the privity
rule of the common law, but also to the effectiveness of warranty disclaimers in products cases.' '92 The validity of exculpatory clauses is
affected not only by decisions like Henningsen, but also by various
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code such as section 2-719,
which states: "[A] limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
' 26
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."'
As early as 1960 a leading scholar predicted: "Increasing recognition of the doctrine of unenforceability of exculpatory agreements appears to be in prospect, particularly in relation to personal injuries
caused by defects in products sold under contracts of adhesion such as
are commonly used in mass marketing."'' 2 7 This prediction has been
amply fulfilled when personal injury is present. In cases involving prop121. W. PRossER, supranote 6, § 68, at440.
122. See Moss v. Fortune, 207 Tenn. 426, 340 S.W.2d 902 (1960).
123. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
124. Id. at 366-67, 385-89, 161 A.2d 73-74, 84-86. See also General Motors Corp. v. Dodson,
47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960). The Tennessee court, in the same year as the
Henningsen decision, held that an action for damages for breach of warranty could be sustained
without regard to exculpatory provisions in the warranty. The Dodson opinion is not authoritative
on this point, however, because the disclaimer provisions were not discussed.
125. L. FRUMIER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 16.04(2), at 3-143 to -146.
126. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719; L. FRJNIER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 50,
§ 16.04(2), at 3-145 to -146.
127. R. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 138
(1961).
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erty damage or commercial loss, however, exculpatory clauses are more
likely to be enforced. In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. DouglasAircraft Co. "8
plaintiff had purchased a DC-7 plane from defendant. The contract,
defendant's standard form, included elaborate warranties, followed by
a provision that the warranties were in lieu of all warranties whether or
not occasioned by the seller's negligence. The clause also excluded any
liability for consequential damages. Shortly after the plane was purchased, the nose wheel malfunctioned, the plane veered off the runway,

and 200,000 dollars worth of damage was sustained. In a suit by Delta
the trial judge invalidated the exculpatory clause and entered judgment

on plaintiffs verdict. On appeal, the court found the exculpatory clause
valid and ordered judgment for Douglas. Distinguishing other cases,
including Tunkl v. Regents of The University of California,2' as involving personal injuries the court said:
[T]he case at bench involves none of the elements of inequality of bargaining
on which the cited cases . . . have laid their stress. Delta, bargaining for the
purchase and delivery of an airplane yet to be built, is hardly the pain-wracked
sufferer seeking emergency admission to the hospital whose plight secured relief in
Tunkl; it was not faced, as were Henningsen and Vandermark, with an industrywide stock contract not open to negotiation; it is not now faced with a "fine print"
clause not known to it when it signed the contract; and it did not stand as a single
inexperienced individual purchaser vis-a-vis a large seller relatively indifferent to the
making or not making of a single purchase ...
It is suggested that the contract took on an element of a "contract of adhesion" in that the clause was part of Douglas' standard form. But the clause clearly
was open to negotiation, and Delta was free to seek another airplane from another
manufacturer on terms which (so far as this record shows) would not have included
such a clause.'3 0

Express disclaimers, therefore, may be quite effective in the area of
property damage, at least when no contract of adhesion is involved.
B.

Implied Assumption of Risk

In products liability cases, assumption of risk by express agreement
is infrequent; ordinarily consent to the involved risk is simply implied

from conduct of the plaintiff. The principal requirements for using the
defense of assumption of risk are that the plaintiff know, understand,
and voluntarily incur the risk. With reference to knowledge, the plaintiff

must not only know the facts that create the danger, but must comprehend the danger itself. The standard is mainly subjective, with the plain128. 238 Cal. App. 2d 95,47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
129. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
130. 238 Cal. App. 2d at 102-03, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
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13
tiff's age and experience taken into account. ' The issue of the plaintiff's
subjective knowledge and appreciation of the risk usually is a question
of fact to be determined by the jury, but as evidenced by the very few
products liability cases in which defendant has been successful in showing assumption of risk, juries are quite unlikely to decide this issue for
the defense. 32 It therefore becomes vital to determine when a verdict
should be directed.
In the unusual situation when the plaintiff is seeking a directed
verdict, 33 most courts are reluctant to direct a verdict for the plaintiff
even though he has testified that he did not know or understand the risk,
particularly if proof that the plaintiff should have appreciated the risk
suggests that he in fact did appreciate it. 34 When the defendant is seeking
a directed verdict, many cases have held as a matter of law that the
plaintiff did in fact appreciate the risk. In attempting to determine when
a court should direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground that
plaintiff must have appreciated the risk, it will be helpful to look at some
recent decisions. 135 The evidence in several of these cases indicated plaintiff had some degree of knowledge of trouble with the brakes on his
automobile. In Sperling v. Hatch,136 a husband and wife purchased a
used car after they were assured that the car had received a complete
brake job. About two weeks later the wife complained that the brakes
"pulled" or "grabbed." Defendant's service department worked several
times on the brakes. When the wife still complained that the trouble was
not corrected and returned the car for further servicing, it was delivered
back to her, with the statement that the problem was "all in her head."
Thereupon she told her husband about her continued difficulties. He
drove the car, noticed that the brakes "pulled" to the right, and warned
his wife that they would "grab" if applied suddenly at a speed of 40 to
45 miles per hour. He had taken a four-year course in auto mechanics
and another course in the service, and did brake work on his own cars.
Later on the same day, while driving at 45 to 55 miles per hour,
the wife applied the brakes. The brakes grabbed, and the car went out
of control and crashed, with resulting injuries to both husband and wife.

131. R. Keeton, supra note 127, at 141. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 447.
132. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 447; R. Keeton, supra note 127, at 139.
133. E.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); see text
accompanying note 60 supra.
134. E.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 111.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); R. Keeton,
supra note 127, at 142.
135. Earlier decisions involving a directed verdict on grounds of actual or presumed appreciation of the risk are carefully analyzed in R. Keeton, supra note 127, at 138-44.
136. 10 Cal. App. 3d 54, 88 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1970).
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The plaintiffs both sued the defendant dealer. The trial judge dismissed
the suits holding that the plaintiffs had assumed the risk as a matter of
law. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal as to the husband, but
reversed the decision against the wife, stating:
The issue of assumption of the risk is a question of fact for jury determination
in all but the clearest cases. . . . Actual knowledge of the risk and appreciation of
its magnitude are subjective requisites, rarely susceptible of proof by direct evidence.
Ordinarily, these elements of the defense can only be established by circumstantial
evidence . . . . Where, however, a plaintiff admits in his own testimony he had
knowledge of the danger and appreciated the risk involved, the elements of the
defense are established by direct testimony; there is no room for conflicting inferences and no fact question is presented for jury determination ...
Mr. Sperling's testimony clearly and unequivocally demonstrates he voluntarily assumed the risk . . . . The testimony reveals: He was knowledgeable about and
experienced with automobile brakes. He had tested the car's brakes on the day of
the accident. He knew the brakes were defective, that the right front wheel
"grabbed," causing the car to veer to the right. He was concerned about the
defect. . . . Nevertheless, he willingly rode in the car with his wife ....
As to Mrs. Sperling, however, evidence relating to her knowledge of the risk
and appreciation of its magnitude was neither direct nor unequivocal . . . . Moreover, respondent's employees had assured her the brake problem was a figment of
her imagination. Mrs. Sperling's assumption of the risk presented a question of fact
for the jury. 137

It does not appear from the report in Sperling whether the complaint was based on negligence, strict liability in tort, or breach of warranty, and the decision suggests that the defense of voluntary assumption
of risk, and the amount of evidence needed for a directed verdict on that
issue, will be regarded in about the same way regardless of the plaintiff's
theory of recovery. As to the issue of actual appreciation of the risk, it
is not clear whether Mrs. Sperling, after hearing what her husband had
to say and after her own earlier experience with the brakes, appreciated
the risk of driving at 45 miles per hour as much or as little as did Mr.
Sperling. It may be that neither of the Sperlings would have ridden in
the car if they in fact had realized the risk of as serious a malfunction
of the brakes as in fact occurred. Mrs. Sperling undoubtedly had passed
on to her husband the defendant's assurance that the brakes were in
order, but the court did not seem to give enough weight to the factor
that if the plaintiff "surrenders his better judgment upon an assurance
that the situation is safe, he does not assume the risk."' 3 s So in General
Motors v. Dodson,3 1 the court approved the plaintiffs' claims based on
defective brakes, even though it appeared that they had "used the auto137.
138.
139.

Id. at 62. 88 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
W. PROssER, supra note 6, § 68, at 450.
47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
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mobile when they knew the brakes were defective," because "each time
the plaintiffs would take the car to an authorized dealer, such dealer
would assure plaintiffs that the brakes were in good condition."' 40
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,"' the brakes locked on a new
car after 1,500 miles of use. Earlier, the plaintiff had found that the
brakes locked and pulled the car to the right. The plaintiff said he told
the dealer of this incident at the time of the 1,000 mile servicing, but the
records did not indicate any complaint. The court held that both the
dealer and manufacturer could be held strictly liable for a defect that
may have arisen only after the dealer received the car for servicing. There
is no discussion in the opinion of whether plaintiff's conduct would
constitute voluntary assumption of risk in the event that he did not
report the first brake-locking incident. Perhaps even with a failure to
report, the plaintiff could have assumed that brake deficiencies would
be corrected by the dealer in connection with the 1,000 mile check, and
therefore he could not have been found as a matter of law to have
appreciated the risk of the subsequent accident. Likewise, in Berernan
v. Burdolski,12 the jury was allowed to determine if plaintiff was aware
of the danger from brakes earlier found to be "grabbing" and
"spongy," after assurance that the brakes were "all right."
Finally, in Robbins v. Milner Enterprises,13 plaintiffs affidavit
indicated he had discovered his brakes were "pulling" or "grabbing."
In reversing a summary judgment for defendant, the court referred to
the vast actual differences, both in degree and in kind, in the extent to
which brakes may be "pulling" or "grabbing," and found that the
severity or intensity of this mechanical action, as developed at a trial,
would have appreciable bearing on whether the danger was in fact "obvious" to the plaintiff.
1. Age, Intelligence, and Experience-Effect on Recognizing
Obvious Dangers.-The above decisions illustrate the need for caution
in directing a verdict on the assumption of risk issue, and the need for
140. Id. at 452, 338 S.W.2d at 662. The Sperling decision is weakened by the fact that 3 of
7 judges of the supreme court thought the case should have been heard on a further appeal. The
defective brake case on which the majority relied, Gallegos v. Nash, San Francisco, 137 Cal. App.
2d 14, 289 P.2d 835 (1955), is not closely in point, for there the plaintiff's claim was not dismissed.
but the court simply let the jury decide. The jury responded with a verdict for the defendant on the
ground that the plaintiff knew at the time of the accident the brakes were "spongy" and "very
sensitive" even though assured by defendant's salesman on the morning of the accident that "the
brakes had been inspected and checked, and were O.K." Id. at 16, 289 P.2d at 837.
141. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
142. 204 Kan. 162,460 P.2d 567 (1969).
143. 278 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1960) (applying Mississippi law).
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consideration of all the circumstances. Undoubtedly, some dangers are
so clear that in the absence of some satisfactory explanation, plaintiff's
denial of his appreciation of the risk is simply not to be believed.,"
Furthermore, if the obviousness of the danger is clear to the plaintiff
because of his "age, experience, and capacity," the court will consider
these special factors in directing a verdict for the defendant. In Saeter
v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co.,"' for example, plaintiff discovered that
the front end of his motorcycle would wobble at high speeds. In holding
that a verdict should have been directed for the defendant on the ground
that plaintiff actually knew of the danger, the court emphasized that the
plaintiff was 28 years old, and had used and owned various motorcycles
over a period of five or six years. 4 ' On the other hand, a plaintiff's lack
of age and similar characteristics can be weighed in his favor. According
to the Restatement, "The standard to be applied is a subjective one, of
what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands, and appreciates . . . . If by reason of age, or lack of information, experience,
intelligence, or judgment, the plaintiff does not understand the risk involved in a known situation, he will not be taken to assume the risk
"1147

48
The point may be further illustrated by Sweeney v. Matthews.
Plaintiff, a carpenter, was hammering concrete nails. After the heads of
three or four of them broke off, the nail he was hammering shattered,
and a piece struck him in the eye. In declining to direct a verdict for the
defendant on the issue of assumption of risk, the court noted that plaintiff was nineteen years old, had worked as a carpenter only a short time,
and in earlier work with concrete nails had found them strong enough
to resist shattering.
2. Subjective Realization of Risk.-In products liability cases,
courts ordinarily require plaintiff to have actually realized the danger
before he is held to have assumed the risk. So in the Saeter decision
the court stated the plaintiffs knowledge of the danger "must be actual."'4 In Bereman v. Burdolski,50 however, the court approved an

144. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 448.
145. 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1960).
146. See also Spradlin v. Klump, 244 Ark. 841,427 S.W.2d 542 (1968) (the court emphasized
that the user of a defective farm machine, against whom a verdict was directed, possessed 20 years
experience with farm machinery).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, comment c at 575 (1965). See also id.
§§ 496A. comment dat 562, 496C, comment eat 571.
148. 94 III. App. 2d 6,236 N.E.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1968).
149. 186 Cal. App. 2d at 255, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 752. See also Morrow v. Trailmobile, Inc., 12
Ariz. App. 578, 473 P.2d 780 (1970) (requiring subjective appreciation of the danger). Earlier cases
to this effect are cited in R. Keeton, supra note 127, at 141-42.
150. 204 Kan. 162, 164, 460 P.2d 567, 569 (1969).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25

instruction that the plaintiff was barred if he was aware of the defect in
the brakes or "should have been aware of it, and thereafter continued
to use the vehicle." Other decisions have used similar language.' 5 ' Perhaps this language means only that a jury could conclude after finding
that he should have appreciated it, that in view of the circumstances
plaintiff actually did appreciate the risk. This is particularly true if the
instructions as a whole indicate that the jury must find consent to an
actually realized risk.
3. Voluntary Acceptance of Risk.-Although the risk is realized,
no sufficient consent is present unless the plaintiff's choice is free and
voluntary.' 52 This point has not been developed extensively in products
liability cases, but in the Saeter decision it was emphasized that the
motorcyclist continued his pleasure trip after discovery of a defect in his
cycle, without the "slightest compulsion of business or otherwise." 5 '
It is possible that even in connection with his employment a person
who fully appreciates the danger from a defective machine may not have
consented to the risk. This problem arose in a recent case, Edler v.
Crawley Book Machinery Co.'54 An employee was using a machine that
involved some sharp blades designed to put creases in sheets of paper
being pressed for binding. Plaintiff allowed two of her fingers to protrude slightly into a dangerous opening where they were severed by the
blades. The court held that "if the plaintiff's fingers became placed in a
dangerous position in the machine by reason of inadvertance, momentary inattention or diversion of attention," this did not necessarily
amount to assumption of risk.5 5 The court distinguished Bartkewich v.
Billinger151 in which a plaintiff had deliberately inserted his hand into a
glass-breaking machine. The result in Bartkewich probably would have
been different if inadvertence were involved as distinguished from the
risk of deliberately reaching into a dangerous part of the machine.
The principal interest of the Edler case, however, is its statement
about assumption of risk and whether it is relevant to an employee who
is working with a machine found to be dangerous. The court stated:
"This [Restatement] theory of concern for the user, however, is not
151. See Downey v. Moore's Time-Saving Equip., Inc., 432 F.2d 1088, 1093 (7th Cir. 1970)
(applying Indiana law); McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 235 Mo. App. 612,
626, 144 S.W.2d 866, 872 (1940); Wood v.Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191,201,238 S.W.2d
172, 178 (1951).
152. W. PROSSER. supra note 6, § 68, at 450.
153. 186 Cal. App. 2d at 257, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
154. 441 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1971) (applying Pennsylvania law).
155. Id. at 774.
156. 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
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unfairly frustrated by sanctioning a defense against the claim of a person
who knows of the defect but chooses to use the product nevertheless. It
is fair to state in such a situation that the manufacturer's obligation to
furnish a safe product has been waived by the [employee's] considered
choice to chance the danger involved in the defect.' 1 57 Application of this
dictum to an employee seems questionable. When an employee consents
to work under dangerous conditions, this consent ordinarily is not regarded as effective in a suit against the employer because of the economic pressure involved.' 58 It would seem that when a manufacturer
supplies a dangerous machine for 'ise by employees, the workman injured because of the unsafe design is subject to comparable economic
pressure and that his consent to use the dangerous machine, perhaps in
order to retain his job, is likewise not free and voluntary.' The economic pressure imposed on an employee assigned to a dangerous machine was specifically recognized in a recent case. " " While activating a.
foot pedal that operated a large punch press, plaintiff lost her balance
and her hand and arm slipped into the machine. In upholding a jury
finding that there was no voluntary assumption of risk, even though
plaintiff knew that the machine was unguarded, the court observed that
plaintiff may not have realized the risk of falling in this manner, and
added. "The 'voluntariness' with which a worker assigned to a dangerous machine in a factory 'assumes the risk of injury' from the machine
6
is illusory."'
By way of summary, the general tendency of the recent cases is to
let the jury determine the issue of voluntary assumption of risk. The
instructions ordinarily will indicate that circumstances showing the
plaintiff realized the danger, even though he says he did not, may be
considered. The crucial fact to be determined, however, is whether the
plaintiff fully appreciated the risk and with this appreciation was willing
to encounter it, or at least externally manifested such a willingness. The
current trend away from directing a verdict on the ground that the
plaintiff's assumption of risk is "obvious" is in accord with the related
trend in defective design cases to permit the jury to find that a design is
unreasonably dangerous, even though the absence of a needed safety
157. 441 F.2d at 774.
158. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 452.
159. Cf Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 201, 238 S.W.2d 172, 178 (1951)
(observing that a workman would not of his own free will have placed himself near a product with
possible dangerous defects "and put himself in a position to be killed by it").
160. Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (applying Arkansas
law).
161. Id.at 381.
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device is apparent. 16 2 The occasional willingness of a court to direct a
verdict on the assumption of risk issue, in strict liability cases, will
depend considerably on the court's attitude toward strict liability. If not
firmly convinced of the wisdom of this doctrine, or if not convinced that
objective contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be disregarded
in strict liability cases, the court will be more inclined to find voluntary
assumption of risk as a matter of law, just as it will be more inclined to
rule against the plaintiff as a matter of law on the issue of abnormal use.
On the other hand, if a court firmly accepts strict liability, with reliance
on such considerations as ability to administer the risk or the presence
of extensive representations to users and consumers about the safety of
the dangerous products, the result may well be different. These courts
will be much more willing to leave the issue of voluntary assumption of
risk to the jury.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is generally accepted that abnormal use and assumption of risk
are available as defenses in products liability cases, and if the abnormal
use is clear, or if the risk is so obvious that it must have been realized,
a verdict occasionally will be directed for the defendant on these issues.
The current trend, however, is to leave both of these issues to the jury.
This seems wise, particularly since the distinctions between abnormal
use, contributory negligence, and voluntary assumption of risk are not
clear.
The courts that take the issues of abnormal use or assumption of
risk from the jury are apt to be influenced, either consciously or subconsciously, by their basic attitude toward strict liability. If in a given case
a court thinks that the strict liability principle should be strengthened,
it is apt to leave questions of abnormal use and assumption of risk to
the jury, or may even direct a verdict for the plaintiff. If the court has
doubts about strict liability, it is likely to find that abnormal use, or
assumption of a more or less obvious risk, has been established as a
matter of law.
With reference to contributory negligence, almost all of the courts
adopting the strict tort principle as set forth in the Restatement have also
adopted the view expressed in the comment that an objectively negligent
162. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 467 P.2d 229, 235, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 635 (1970) (finding that "[u]nder the modern rule, even though the absence of a particular safety precaution is obvious, there ordinarily would be a question for the jury as to whether or
not failure to install the device creates an unreasonable risk"). The language thus used is quoted
from Noel, supra note 25, at 838.
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failure to discover the defect in a product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence, is not a defense. 6 3 A noticeable amount of judicial
and academic dissent from this view has developed, however, with the
dissenters urging that contributory negligence of this kind should at least
serve to diminish the amount of the plaintiff's recovery. Here again
courts are influenced by their views about strict liability, and more
particularly by the grounds on which they arrive at these views. If a court
adheres to strict liability primarily on the ground that once a product is
shown to be defective and dangerous, negligence probably was present,
even though it cannot be proved, such a court may be inclined to regard
contributory negligence as a defense, just as it is in cases based on
provable negligence. Conversely, if a court arrives at strict liability primarily through acceptance of administration of risk doctrines, or acceptance of the concept that serious misrepresentation is found in the
advertising and sale of a dangerous product, it will be less inclined to
give any weight to contributory negligence.
In view of the reluctance in some quarters to leave basic policy
factors to appellate court judges, and a distrust of the complexities and
uncertainties of products liability law, it probably will be advocated by
some that recovery from harm caused by a defective product, as well as
harm caused by motor vehicle accidents, should be placed on a limited
recovery, no-fault basis. As to motor vehicles, it appears that no-fault
automobile accident law covering all except fairly serious accidents is
likely to prevail within the next few years, although most trial lawyers,
an articulate and influential group, are opposed to any substantial nofault developments. "4 Most scholars, editorial writers, and "consumer
advocates," on the other hand, are so concerned with the inadequacies
of the present automobile accident reparations system and the impracticality of relating fault to the present insurance situation, that they support various no-fault plans. If the prophesied development of no-fault
reparations in the automobile accident area takes place, then products
law may well be the next target for limited recovery, no-fault compensation, although the prospect of this development for accident claims of
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n at 356 (1965).
164. See R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 149 (1969); Noel, Strict Tort Liability
Compared with No-Fault Automobile Accident Reparations,38 TENN. L. REV. 297, 303, 307, 319
(1971). Trial lawyers believe that tort law should remain closely allied to fault, and that fault
concepts are deeply rooted in human nature and have been closely related to the regulation of human
affairs from the time when law began. The trial lawyers are further influenced by other factors.
They like their work and the adequate compensation attached to it; they distrust the fairness of
administrative handling of the enormous accident reparations field. Furthermore, they dislike serious limitations on the amount of recovery by the victim of a careless driver.
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all kinds, as recommended by one leading scholar, 5 seems remote.
At the present time courts and lawyers are faced with handling
products liability cases in accord with the principles laid down in the
decisions, with such additional help as may be secured from the
Restatement and legal writers. Hopefully the present article may assist
this process in the significant areas of abnormal use, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.
165. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967).

